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1 Introduction
This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent
has an ex post outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent’s informa-
tion sequentially. Unlike in the standard model with only ex ante outside options, the optimal
contract is, instead, static and conditions only on the agent’s aggregate final information.1
Introducing ex post participation constraints contributes to the understanding of dynamic
adverse selection problems from both a conceptual and practical perspective. Conceptually, our
approach allows us to identify the reason why, in the absence of ex post participation constraints,
sequential screening is strictly better than static screening. Compared to a static screening
model where all of the agent’s information arrives ex ante, the constraints in a sequential
screening problem are weaker for two reasons: First, sequential screening relaxes incentive
compatibility constraints because it is easier to prevent the agent from lying about his ex ante
information when he does not yet know his ex post information. Second, in the sequential
model with only an ex ante outside option, the contract needs to give the agent his outside
option only in expectation rather than for all possible contingencies of ex ante and ex post
information as in the static model. Our result makes clear that the value of sequential screening
in the standard model without ex post participation constraints arises solely from the second
reason—relaxed participation constraints—rather than from the first reason—relaxed incentive
constraints. This conclusion follows because ex post participation constraints affect only the
participation constraints while leaving the incentive constraints unaffected.
Comparing sequential screening models with ex ante and ex post participation constraints
in terms of information rents reveals striking qualitative differences. The results of Eso¨ and
Szentes (2007a,b) imply that when there are only ex ante participation constraints then the
principal can extract at no cost the entire value of the agent’s ex post information. Hence, the
agent does not obtain any rents from his ex post, but only from his ex ante private information.
In contrast, our result implies that with ex post participation constraints the agent receives
information rents from both his ex ante and ex post private information.
1The (strict) optimality of sequential screening in the absence of ex post participation constraints has been
most cleanly established in Courty and Li (2000) and features also in Baron and Besanko (1984), Battaglini
(2005), Eso¨ and Szentes (2007a, b), Dai et al. (2006), Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2008, 2011), Inderst and Hoffmann
(2009), Pavan et al. (2008).
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This insight is reminiscent of Sappington (1983), who observes that in static adverse selection
problems, when the agent’s private information arrives after contracting and the agent cannot
sustain ex post losses, the optimal contract is the same as when the agent’s information arrives
before contracting. Analogously, in our dynamic setup, the optimal contract with ex post
participation constraints is the same as when all of the agent’s information arrives before
contracting. This dynamic extension of Sappington’s result is, however, not obvious. In a
static problem, ex post participation constraints reduce the set of implementable contracts to
the same set as when the agent’s information arrives ex ante. The result therefore follows
directly from implementability considerations. For dynamic setups, we show in contrast that
ex post participation constraints do not render sequential contracts infeasible.2 The principal,
however, does not benefit from offering a sequential contract. Hence, our result follows from
optimality rather than implementability considerations.
We obtain our result in the canonical, unit good sequential screening framework with an
arbitrary finite number of ex ante and a continuum of ex post agent types and non–shifting
support. In particular, we consider a procurement context where the principal seeks to acquire
a good from the agent who, while observing a private signal ex ante, learns his true costs only
as the relation proceeds. Without ex post participation constraints, the optimal contract can
be implemented by a menu of option contracts. An option contract consists of a (possibly
negative) up–front payment from the principal to the agent, and gives the agent the option to
deliver the good at a pre–specified exercise price after having observed his true costs. Because,
ex ante, agent types have different priors about the likelihood of exercising the option, the
principal can screen the agent’s prior by offering different combinations of up–front payments
and exercise prices.
Our result implies that offering a menu with a variety of different option contracts is no
longer optimal in the presence of ex post participation constraints. To see the reason for this,
assume to the contrary that, at the optimum, different ex ante types select different option
contracts. Observe first that when the agent’s true ex post costs happen to equal the exercise
price, the agent is indifferent between production and not and, thus, obtains no additional
payoff from production. Therefore, with ex post participation constraints, the principal cannot
demand an up–front fee, because it would imply an ex post loss for the agent if his true costs
equal the exercise price. Clearly, not all contracts in the optimal menu can have positive up–
2Indeed, Courty and Li (2000)’s footnote 8 can be understood in this way.
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front payments to the agent, because by lowering all of them slightly the principal could do
better. Now consider an ex ante type who, at the optimum, selects a contract with a zero
up–front payment. This type’s contract must display the largest exercise price (otherwise he
would have an incentive to pick a contract with a larger exercise price and take advantage of
both the higher up–front payment and the higher exercise price). Call this contract with the
zero up–front payment and the largest exercise price the “high price” contract.
Now, the contracts selected by the other ex ante types, by definition, have a smaller exercise
price, therefore these types produce less frequently ex post than under the “high price” contract,
and therefore the “high price” contract is more efficient. Moreover, by incentive compatibility
they must get at least the same rent which they get if they choose the “high price” contract. But
this implies that the principal is better off by offering the “high price” contract to all(!) agent
types. Because then she has to pay at most the same rent as under the sequential contract,
and production is more efficient. Therefore, with ex post participation constraints, it is not
optimal to screen ex ante types, but instead offer only a single (i.e. static) contract.3
The previous reasoning only applies to option contracts. The core analytical challenge of our
paper is to show that option contracts are optimal. In the absence of ex post participation con-
straints, the optimality of option contracts can be established by considering a relaxed problem
which only considers the “local” ex ante incentive constraints in the spirit of Mirrlees. Under
appropriate regularity conditions, the solution to the relaxed problem is automatically mono-
tone in the ex post type and thus ex post incentive compatible. In the unit good framework,
monotonicity in the ex post type implies that the good, depending on type, is produced with
probability of either zero or one, which, in turn, implies that the contract can be implemented
as an option contract. We argue that in our case, such a Mirrleesian–type, “local” approach
does not work, since the solution to the corresponding relaxed problem is not automatically
monotone in the ex post type. Instead, as the main methodological contribution of the paper,
we develop an inductive procedure to identify the binding “global” constraints. The procedure
reduces a model with n+ 1 ex ante types to a model with n ex ante types by merging the two
3This argument fails if there are only ex ante participation constraints. At the optimum, the principal then
charges an up–front fee for the contract with the largest exercise price. Only the agent who is most optimistic
about his future costs chooses this contract. The agent type with the most pessimistic prior would make an
expected loss from this contract. Thus, only offering the “high price” contract would violate ex ante participation
constraints.
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most extreme ex ante types of the n+1 types model. The set of binding incentive constraints for
the n+1 types model is then obtained by adding an appropriate constraint to those constraints
of the n types model which are, by induction, known to be binding.
Investigating the consequences of ex post participation constraints also contributes to a
better understanding of real–world contracts. Ex post participation constraints are empirically
relevant, since the principal’s ability to inflict ex post losses on the agent is often greatly lim-
ited in practice. In employment relations, employees typically have the legal right to leave their
employer at will. Such non–slavery conditions imply that the employer cannot inflict losses on
her employee and must respect the employee’s ex post participation constraints. Alternatively,
ex post participation constraints arise because workers are credit or wealth constrained. The
relevance of ex post participation constraints is even more compelling in procurement relation-
ships, where the agent as a corporation is legally protected by limited liability and, therefore,
cannot make losses. Indeed, procurement contracts that inflict losses on the agent simply drive
him out of business, leaving the contract unfulfilled. Similarly, legally granted money–back
guarantees give consumers the right to return the good and being fully refunded. In the mail
order business in Germany, for example, sellers are required by law to grant consumers a full
refund (including all postal charges) up to 14 days after purchase.
Our analysis predicts that in the presence of ex post participation constraints, “simple”
contracts are optimal, thus providing a rationale for “incomplete” contracts which depend only
on the agent’s final information instead of on the entire contingent information flow which the
agent observes.4 Likewise, our results imply for multi–agent versions of our setup that standard,
static auctions are optimal even when agents obtain their private information sequentially.
Indeed, Eso¨ and Szentes (2007b) show that without ex post participation constraints, the
optimal contract with multiple agents is a “handicap auction” where in the first round, bidders
pick a premium from a menu offered by the auctioneer, and in the second round, bidders play
a second price auction where the winner pays the second highest bid plus his premium from
round 1. We argue that with ex post participation constraints, the optimal mechanism is static
and thus a second price auction with an optimal reserve price.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the setup. In
section 3, we derive the principal’s problem. In section 4, we discuss three benchmark cases. In
4For a similar result in a dynamic adverse selection model with contractible ex post information, see Chiu
and Sappington (2010).
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section 5, we illustrate the main argument and the main intuition behind our result in the case
when the agent’s ex ante information is binary. In section 6, we solve the principal’s problem
for the general case and derive our main result. Section 7 discusses extensions, and section 8
concludes.
2 The Setup
Consider a principal (she) who seeks to buy a good or service from an agent (he).5 The value of
the good for the principal is commonly known to be v > 0. The agent’s costs of production are
θ ∈ [0, 1]. The terms of trade are the probability with which production takes place, x ∈ [0, 1],
and a payment t ∈ R from the principal to the agent.
Parties are risk–neutral and have quasi–linear utility functions. That is, under the terms
of trade x and t, the principal receives utility vx − t, and the agent receives utility t − θx.
Consequently, the aggregate surplus is (v − θ)x.
At the time of contracting about the terms of trade, no party knows the true costs, θ,
but the agent has private information about the distribution of costs. After the principal
offers the contract but before production takes place, the agent privately learns the true costs
θ. Formally, there are two periods. In period 1, the agent knows that costs are distributed
according to distribution function Gi with non–shifting support [0,1], where i is drawn from the
set ω ≡ {1, . . . , n} with probability pi > 0. We refer to i as the agent’s ex ante type. In period
2, the agent observes his ex post type θ which is drawn according to Gi. While the agent’s ex
ante and ex post types are his private information, the distributions of ex ante and ex post
types are common knowledge.
We depart from the existing sequential screening literature and consider the case in which
agent can always quit after learning the true costs θ and receive an ex post outside option. We
assume that the outside option is type–independent and normalize it to zero.
Next, we state our distributional assumptions and introduce notation. The probability
density gi(θ) = G
′
i(θ) exists, is differentiable, and is strictly positive for all θ ∈ [0, 1]. Moreover,
5The setup is isomorphic to a buyer seller relationship where the principal acts as a seller with commonly
known marginal costs and the agent as a buyer with private information about his willingness to pay.
6
we define by
hi,j(θ) ≡
Gi(θ)
gj(θ)
, and hi(θ) ≡ hi,i(θ),
the cross hazard rate between the types i and j and the hazard rate of type i. We assume that:
hi,j and hi are non–decreasing in θ for all i, j.
We define conditional distributions associated with a subset of types. For γ ⊆ ω, let
pγ =
∑
i∈γ pi be the probability of γ, and define by
Gγ(θ) ≡
1
pγ
∑
i∈γ
piGi(θ), gγ(θ) ≡
1
pγ
∑
i∈γ
pigi(θ), hγ(θ) ≡
Gγ(θ)
gγ(θ)
(1)
the conditional distribution, conditional density, and conditional hazard rate conditional on the
event that the ex ante type is in γ. Moreover, define for two subsets γ, δ ⊆ ω the conditional
cross hazard rate
hγ,δ(θ) ≡
Gγ(θ)
gδ(θ)
.
Monotonicity of the (cross) hazard rates carries over to the conditional (cross) hazard rates:
Lemma 1 hγ,δ is non–decreasing in θ for all γ, δ ⊆ ω.
For each type i, We define the ex post cutoff type θi implicitly by
v = θi + hi(θi). (2)
Because the hazard rate is non–decreasing, there is at most one solution to (2). Without loss
of generality, we label the ex ante types according to the order of the ex post cutoff types:
θ1 ≤ . . . ≤ θi ≤ . . . ≤ θn.
We extend the definition of ex post cutoff type to subsets γ of types by defining θγ as the
solution to
v = θγ + hγ(θγ) (3)
which, by Lemma 1, is unique. The cutoff θγ displays an averaging feature in the sense that it
lies in between the lowest and highest cutoffs associated to the types in γ:
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Lemma 2 Let γ, δ ⊂ ω be disjoint. Then θγ∪δ ∈ [min{θγ, θδ},max{θγ, θδ}].
We close this section with the following remarks about our modeling setup:
Remark 1: As is standard in the literature on sequential screening, the agent’s ex ante private
information does not shift the support of his final ex post type. This non–shifting support
assumption facilitates the characterization of incentive compatibility off the equilibrium path.6
Moreover, the agent’s ex ante type i is payoff–irrelevant in the sense that it does not directly
affect the final cost type θ. This assumption is, however, without loss of generality, because if
final costs are given as a function θ(i, s) of both the agent’s ex ante information i and some ex
post information s that he receives in period 2, then we can redefine the agent’s ex post type
as the value of the random variable θ(i, s).
Remark 2: Non–decreasing hazard rates hi are a standard assumption in static screening mod-
els, because they ensure that solutions ”automatically” exhibit a monotonicity property. To
obtain an analogous property in our setting, we also require non–decreasing cross hazard rates.
This is satisfied for large and natural families of distributions. It essentially requires that the
cumulative distributions increase faster than the densities. Hence, a sufficient condition is that
densities are non–increasing.
Remark 3: Our ranking of ex ante types by their ex post cutoff type θi is simply a labeling
convention. It does not imply any restrictions on the stochastic order ranking of the distribu-
tions Gi. In particular, our result does not require that the distributions Gi be ranked in terms
of first or second order stochastic dominance, as is the case in standard sequential screening
models such as Courty and Li (2000). However, in the special case that the hazard rates hi are
decreasing in i, it is well–known that Gj first order stochastically dominates Gi for θi > θj.
3 Principal’s problem
The principal’s problem is to design a contract that maximizes her expected utility. In this
section, we describe the principal’s problem formally. Because the agent has private information,
the terms of trade optimally depend on communication by the agent to the principal. By the
revelation principle for sequential games (e.g., Myerson 1986), the optimal contract can be
found in the class of direct and incentive compatible contracts which induces the agent to
6See Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2008) for an elaboration of this point.
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A learns
ex ante type i
P offers direct
contract (x, t)
A reports
ex ante type j
A learns
ex post type θ
A reports
ex post type θ′
A decides
whether to quit
Figure 1: Time line
report his type truthfully at the ex ante as well as at the ex post stage. Formally, a direct
contract
(x, t) = (xj(θ
′), tj(θ
′))j∈ω,θ′∈[0,1]
requires the agent to report an ex ante type j in period 1, and an ex post type θ′ in period 2.
A contract commits the principal to a production schedule xj(θ
′) and a transfer schedule tj(θ
′).
A direct contract induces a game with a timing structure as illustrated in Figure 1.
If the agent’s true ex post type is θ and his period 1 report was j, then his utility from
reporting θ′ in period 2 is
uj(θ
′; θ) ≡ tj(θ
′)− θxj(θ
′).
With slight abuse of notation, we denote the agent’s period 2 utility from truth–telling by
uj(θ) ≡ uj(θ; θ).
The contract is incentive compatible in period 2 if it gives the agent an incentive to announce
his ex post type truthfully. That is, if for all j ∈ ω,
uj(θ) ≥ uj(θ
′; θ) for all θ, θ′ ∈ [0, 1]. (4)
If the contract is incentive compatible in period 2, the agent announces his ex post type truth-
fully no matter what his report in the first period.7 Hence, if the agent’s true ex ante type is
i, then his period 1 utility from reporting j is
Uji ≡
∫ 1
0
uj(θ) dGi(θ).
7Observe that the fact that agent’s period 2 utility is independent of his ex ante type implies that a contract
which is incentive compatible in period 2 automatically induces truth–telling in period 2 also off the equilibrium
path, that is, if the agent has misreported his ex ante type in period 1. Observe also that, in general, optimality
does not require truth–telling off the path. See Kra¨hmer and Strausz (2008) for an elaboration of this point.
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We denote, again with a slight abuse of notation, the agent’s period 1 utility from truth–telling
by
Ui = Uii.
The contract is incentive compatible in period 1 if it gives the agent an incentive to announce
his ex ante type truthfully:
Ui ≥ Uji for all i, j ∈ ω. (5)
To ensure the agent’s participation for all cost realizations, the contract needs to satisfy the ex
post individual rationality constraint:
ui(θ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ ω, θ ∈ [0, 1]. (6)
In contrast, an incentive compatible contract is ex ante individually rational if
Ui ≥ 0 for all i ∈ ω. (7)
Clearly, ex post individual rationality implies ex ante individual rationality. We say a contract
is feasible if it is incentive compatible (in both periods) and ex post individually rational.
By definition, the principal’s payoff from a feasible contract is the difference between ag-
gregate surplus and the agent’s utility. That is, if the agent’s ex ante type is i, the principal’s
conditional expected payoff is
Wi ≡
∫ 1
0
{[v − θ]xi(θ)− ui(θ)} dGi(θ),
so that the principal’s expected payoff is
W ≡
∑
i∈ω
piWi.
The principal’s problem is therefore to find a direct contract (x∗, t∗) that solves the following
maximization problem:
max
(x,t)
W s.t. (4), (5), (6).
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3.1 Eliminating transfers from the principal’s problem
Our approach to solving the principal’s problem is to follow standard procedures of static
screening problems as closely as possible. Because for a given first period report, the second
period incentive compatibility constraints are the same as in a static screening problem, our first
step is to exploit the fact that second period incentive compatibility pins down the agent’s utility
as a function of the allocation x alone. This yields the familiar result that incentive compatibility
is equivalent to monotonicity of the production schedule and to “revenue equivalence”, which
means that the agent’s utility is determined by the production schedule up to a constant. We
state this standard result without proof.
Lemma 3 For all i ∈ ω, there are transfers ti(θ) so that second period incentive compatibility
(4) is equivalent to
xi(θ) is non–increasing in θ, (MON)
ui(θ) =
∫ 1
θ
xi(z) dz + ui(1). (RE)
Lemma 3 has three useful implications. First, we can replace the second period incentive
constraints (4) in the principal’s problem by the constraints (MON) and (RE). We can then
eliminate the constraint (RE) by inserting ui(θ) directly in the principal’s objective. After
an integration by parts, the principal’s objective transforms into the familiar expected virtual
surplus minus the agent’s utility of the least efficient ex post type θ = 1:
Wi =
∫ 1
0
[v − θ − hi(θ)]xi(θ) dGi(θ)− ui(1). (8)
The second implication of Lemma 3 is that (RE) also pins down the agent’s period 1 utility
Uji, which is simply the expectation over period 2 utility. Applying integration by parts, we
arrive at the following characterization of the first period incentive constraints:
Lemma 4 Consider a contract which satisfies (RE). Then first period incentive compatibility
(5) is equivalent to∫ 1
0
[xi(θ)− xj(θ)]Gi(θ) dθ + ui(1)− uj(1) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ ω. (ICij)
The third useful implication of Lemma 3 is that because xi is non–decreasing, the agent’s
ex post utility ui(θ) is non–increasing in his ex post type θ. Thus, ex post individual rationality
is satisfied for all types if it holds for the highest type θ = 1:
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Lemma 5 Consider a contract which satisfies (MON) and (RE). Then ex post individual
rationality (6) is equivalent to
ui(1) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ ω. (IRi)
By the previous three lemmas, the following equivalent representation of the principal’s
problem obtains when we replace the payment t by the vector u = {ui(1)}i∈ω of utilities of the
highest ex post type:
P : max
x,u
∑
i∈ω
pi
∫ 1
0
[v − θ − hi(θ)]xi(θ) dGi(θ)− piui(1)
s.t. (MON), (ICij), (IRi).
Before solving P , it is helpful to introduce some more notation. With slight abuse of
notation, we also refer to a pair (x,u) as a contract. We define a cutoff schedule with cutoff
θˆ ∈ [0, 1] as
x¯(θ|θˆ) ≡


1 if θ ≤ θˆ,
0 otherwise.
We say that a contract (x,u) is a cutoff contract if each production schedule xi(θ) coincides with
some cutoff schedule with cutoff θˆi. Note that a cutoff contract can be indirectly implemented
by a menu of option contracts, which consists of an up–front payment that the agent receives
in period 1 and an exercise price which the agent only receives when he decides to produce
the good in period 2. To see this note that, under a cutoff contract, the agent is required to
produce if he reports an ex post type below θˆi after having announced an ex ante type i. In
this case, the ex post type θ obtains utility θˆi − θ + ui(1). If, instead, he reports a type above
θˆi, the agent does not produce and obtains utility ui(1). Hence, a cutoff contract (x,u) can
be implemented by the menu of i = 1, . . . , n option contracts with the up–front payment ui(1)
and the exercise price θˆi. In what follows, we use the notions of cutoff and option contracts
synonymously, whichever interpretation is more convenient.
4 Benchmarks
In this section we discuss three benchmark cases that will play a crucial role in the subsequent
analysis. First, we consider the principal’s problem when the agent’s ex ante type is publicly
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known. Second, we consider the optimal “static” contract whose terms of trade do not depend
on the agent’s ex ante information. This latter contract describes the optimal contract when
the principal does not engage in sequential screening, but offers the contract only after the
agent has obtained all his private information. It is clear that the principal’s payoff from
an optimal contract lies in between these two benchmarks. Finally, we review the optimal
sequential screening contract when the principal has to respect ex ante rather than ex post
participation constraints.
4.1 Publicly known ex ante types
When the agent’s ex ante type is publicly known, the incentive constraints (ICij) are redundant.
Absent these constraints, the ex post individual rationality constraints (IRi) are binding at the
optimum. If we now disregard the monotonicity constraint, pointwise maximization of the
principal’s objective yields that the optimal production schedule is the cutoff schedule with
cutoffs θi as defined in (2). In particular, it satisfies the monotonicity constraint and must,
therefore, be optimal. The next lemma summarizes.
Lemma 6 If the agent’s ex ante type is public information, the optimal contract is a cutoff
contract characterized by upi (1) = 0 and
xpi (θ) = x¯(θ|θi) ∀i ∈ ω.
In other words, if the agent’s ex ante type i is public information, the principal’s problem is
that of a unit good monopsonist facing the supply function Gi. At the optimal contract, the
transfer is equal to the ex post cutoff type θi, and the good is produced whenever costs are
smaller than θi.
4.2 Optimal static contract
We refer to a contract as static if the contract does not condition on the agent’s ex ante type:
xi = xj ≡ x
s and ui(1) = uj(1) ≡ u
s(1) for all i, j ∈ ω. The principal’s objective under a static
contract is
W s =
∫ 1
0
[v − θ − hω(θ)]x
s(θ) dGω(θ)− u
s(1),
where hω and Gω are defined in (1) for γ = ω.
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Under a static contract, the incentive constraints (ICij) hold trivially, and it follows from
inspection of P , that at the optimum, the ex post individual rationality constraints are binding.
Observe that the solution to the unconstrained problem which simply maximizes the princi-
pal’s objective is given by the cutoff schedule with cutoff θω. In particular, it satisfies the
monotonicity constraint and is thus a solution to the constrained problem. The next lemma
summarizes.
Lemma 7 The optimal static contract is a cutoff contract characterized by us(1) = 0 and a
cutoff schedule
xs(θ) = x¯(θ|θω).
In other words, if the principal can only offer a static contract, her problem is that of a unit
good monopsonist facing the average supply function Gω. At the optimal contract, the transfer
is equal to the critical type θω, and the good is produced whenever costs are smaller than θω.
4.3 Ex ante participation constraints
The main benchmark for our analysis is the standard sequential screening model where the
principal has to respect only the ex ante participation constraints (7) rather than the ex post
participation constraints (IRi). In contrast to our main result, the principal does benefit from
sequential screening in this case, as shown by Courty and Li (2000). We now review this
important benchmark.
Courty and Li (2000) identify conditions so that the principal’s problem can be solved by a
“Mirrleesian” approach. That is, the optimal contract obtains from solving a relaxed problem
with only the participation constraint for the highest type i = n, and all “local downward”
incentive constraints ICi,i+1. One of the identified conditions is that the distributions Gi are
ordered in the sense of first order stochastic dominance.8 Courty and Li (2000) further show
that if, in addition, the solution to the relaxed problem exhibits a production schedule that is
monotone in both the ex ante and ex post type, then it represents also a solution to the original
problem. The need for monotonicity puts additional restrictions on the primitives of the model.
8An alternative condition is that the distributions display a particular kind of mean preserving spreads.
Combinations of this MPS–ordering and first order dominance are also fine, but second order dominance in
general does not work.
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The Mirrleesian approach implies that the solution to the relaxed problem exhibits deter-
ministic production schedules xCL which equal 1 whenever the aggregate surplus exceeds the
hazard rate multiplied with an informativeness measure9:
xCLi (θ) = 1 ⇔ v − θ ≥ hˆi(θ) ≡
p1 + . . .+ pi−1
pi
·
Gi−1(θ)−Gi(θ)
gi(θ)
.
Hence, the remaining question is under which conditions the schedules xCL are monotone in
the ex post type θ and the ex ante type i. For the schedules to be monotone in θ, they must
be cutoff schedules with a cutoff θCLi that is the unique solution to v − θ = hˆi(θ). A sufficient
condition for existence and uniqueness of θCLi is that hˆi(θ) is convex in θ and v ≤ 1.
For cutoff schedules to be monotone in the ex ante type, the cutoffs are required to be
decreasing: θCLn ≤ . . . ≤ θ
CL
1 . A sufficient condition to obtain this ordering is that hˆi(θ) is
increasing in i. The following lemma summarizes.
Lemma 8 Suppose Gi dominates Gi−1 in the sense of first order stochastic dominance for all
i = 2, . . . , n, that hˆi(θ) is convex in θ and increasing in i, and that v ≤ 1. Then, with ex ante
participation constraints, the optimal contract (xCL,uCL) exhibits productions schedules that
are characterized by the cutoff schedule xCLi (θ) = x¯(θ|θ
CL
i ) where θ
CL
i is the unique solution to
θCL1 = v, v − θ
CL
i = hˆi(θ
CL
i ) ∀i > 1.
Interestingly, the contract (xCL,uCL) violates all ex post participation constraints. To see
this note that because type n’s ex post utility at the least efficient ex post type, un(1), is pinned
down by (RE) and the binding ex ante participation constraint (7), it follows that un(1) < 0.
Because ui(1) is pinned down by the binding incentive constraint ICi,i+1, the ordering of the
cutoffs implies that the lowest ex ante type gets the lowest utility at the least efficient ex post
type:
0 > un(1) > . . . > u1(1).
This ordering also reveals the intuition why sequential screening is strictly optimal as well as
the role of stochastic dominance: Because lower ex ante types are less likely to become high ex
9Courty and Li (2000) present a continuous version of this measure, while Dai et al. (2006) present it for
the case with two ex ante types. Baron and Besanko (1984) were the first to interpret the second term as an
informativeness measure of the ex ante information.
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post types, they are more willing to tolerate higher losses for higher ex post types. The optimal
screening contract with ex ante participation constraints exploits this feature. It screens ex
ante types by imposing higher ex post losses on lower ex ante types.
5 Two ex ante types
The main result of this paper is that, with ex post participation constraints, the optimal
sequential screening contract coincides with the static one. To gain intuition for this result, we
analyze in this section the case with two ex ante types. To simplify the exposition, we assume
in this section that v = 1.
Our approach to solving the principal’s problem is to consider an appropriate relaxed prob-
lem and to show that its solution also solves the original problem. As in standard screening
problems, we ignore, first, the monotonicity constraint. Second, we ignore the “upward” incen-
tive constraint (IC21), because the solution to the problem with publicly known ex ante type
violates only the “downward” incentive constraint (IC12).
10 Hence, we consider the relaxed
problem
R : max
x1,x2,u1(1),u2(1)
p1
∫ 1
0
[1− θ − h1(θ)]x1(θ) dG1(θ)− p1u1(1)
+p2
∫ 1
0
[1− θ − h2(θ)]x2(θ) dG2(θ)− p2u2(1) s.t.
∫ 1
0
[x1(θ)− x2(θ)]G1(θ) dθ + u1(1)− u2(1) ≥ 0, (IC12)
u1(1) ≥ 0, u2(1) ≥ 0. (IRi)
We now argue that the solution to R is given by the optimal static contract. It will then
also be a solution to the original problem P , because the static contract trivially satisfies all
neglected constraints. The argument has two steps. First, we argue that, for any fixed levels
u1(1) and u2(1), the optimal production schedule must be a cutoff schedule. Then we optimize
over u1(1) and u2(1) and all possible cutoffs to show that the optimal contract is the optimal
static one.
Keeping u1(1) and u2(1) fixed, IC12 is the only remaining constraint. By the Kuhn–Tucker
10In particular,
∫
1
0
[xp
1
(θ)− xp
2
(θ)]G1(θ) dθ + u
p
1
(1)− up
2
(1) = −
∫ θ2
θ1
G1(θ) < 0, since θ1 < θ2.
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theorem11, a solution to R maximizes the Lagrange function
L = p1
∫ 1
0
[1− θ − h1(θ)]x1(θ)dG1(θ)− p1u1(1) + p2
∫ 1
0
[1− θ − h2(θ)]x2(θ)dG2(θ)− p2u2(1)
−λ{
∫ 1
0
[x1(θ)− x2(θ)]G1(θ) dθ + u1(1)− u2(1)},
where λ ≤ 0 is the multiplier associated to the constraint IC12. Re–arranging delivers
L =
∫ 1
0
{p1[1− θ − h1(θ)]− λh1(θ)}x1(θ)g1(θ) dθ − (p1 + λ)u1(1)
+
∫ 1
0
{p2[1− θ − h2(θ)] + λh12(θ)}x2(θ)g2(θ) dθ − (p2 − λ)u2(1).
Observe that we can maximize L point–wisely. In particular, the production schedules x1(θ)
and x2(θ) are optimally set to 1 whenever the respective expressions in the curly brackets under
the integrals,
p1[1− θ − h1(θ)]− λh1(θ), (9)
p2[1− θ − h2(θ)] + λh12(θ), (10)
are positive, and x1(θ) and x2(θ) are set to 0 otherwise. This implies that the production
schedules are cutoff schedules if (9) and (10) are decreasing in θ. To see that this is indeed the
case, recall that λ ≤ 0. Together with h2 and h12 non–decreasing, it then follows that (10) is
decreasing in θ. Next consider (9). It is decreasing in θ if p1 + λ is non–negative, because h1
is non–decreasing in θ. Now let θˆ1 ∈ [0, 1] be such that (9) is zero. If θˆ1 does not exist, then,
because (9) is continuous in θ, x1 is either 0 or 1 everywhere and, hence, a cutoff schedule with
cutoff 0 or 1. Otherwise, we have
p1[1− θˆ1 − h1(θˆ1)]− λh1(θˆ1) = 0 ⇔ p1 + λ =
p1(1− θˆ1)
h1(θˆ1)
≥ 0.
From this it follows that (9) is decreasing in θ, and θˆ1 is therefore unique. Hence, also when θˆ1
exists the optimal production schedules x1(θ) and x2(θ) are characterized by a cutoff schedule
with respective cutoffs θˆ1 and θˆ2.
We now turn to the second step and look for the optimal cutoff schedules and utility levels.
As argued above, the incentive constraint IC12 in problem R must be binding at the optimum,
11See Theorem 1 and 2 in Luenberger (1969, p.187–189).
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because disregarding it would yield a solution that violates it (see footnote 10). Therefore,
given cutoff schedules, the principal’s problem R can be written as:
R′ : max
θˆ1,θˆ1,u1(1)≥0,u2(1)≥0
p1
∫ θˆ1
0
[1− θ − h1(θ)] dG1(θ)− p1u1(1) (11)
+p2
∫ θˆ2
0
[1− θ − h2(θ)] dG2(θ)− p2u2(1)
s.t.
∫ θˆ2
θˆ1
G1(θ) dθ = u1(1)− u2(1). (12)
This representation identifies the principal’s fundamental trade-off. The principal may screen
ex ante types by imposing a different cutoff for each type: θˆ1 6= θˆ2. This allows her to fine–tune
production to the types’ different cost distributions. However, by (12), this is feasible only if
at least one ex post participation constraint is not binding. In other words, screening ex ante
type comes at the cost of giving at least one type a positive ex post utility level ui(1). We now
show that this trade–off is unambiguously resolved in disfavor of screening.
In fact, inspecting R yields u2(1) = 0 at any optimum, because otherwise lowering u2(1)
would relax IC12 and raise the objective. But if u2(1) = 0, then (12) together with the constraint
that u1(1) ≥ 0 implies that only cutoffs with θˆ1 ≤ θˆ2 are feasible. Substituting the constraint
(12) with u2(1) = 0 in the objective (11) yields
p1
∫ θˆ1
0
[1− θ − h1(θ)] dG1(θ)− p1
∫ θˆ2
θˆ1
G1(θ) dθ + p2
∫ θˆ2
0
[1− θ − h2(θ)] dG2(θ)
= p1
∫ θˆ1
0
[1− θ] dG1(θ)− p1
∫ θˆ2
0
G1(θ) dθ + p2
∫ θˆ2
0
[1− θ − h2(θ)] dG2(θ). (13)
Notice that, in the second line, the second and the third term do not depend on θˆ1, and the
first term is expected aggregate surplus, conditional on facing type 1. Since aggregate surplus
is maximized at θˆ1 = 1, it is optimal to choose θˆ1 as large as possible. Because of the restriction
θˆ1 ≤ θˆ2, it then follows that θˆ1 = θˆ2, or, in other words, that a static contract is optimal.
Clearly, among all static contracts the optimal static contract solves the principal’s problem.
This illustrates our main result for the special case of two types: With ex post participation
constraints it is feasible but not optimal for the principal to screen sequentially.
To shed more light on the role of ex post participation constraints, recall that we can
interpret a contract ci = (θˆi, ui(1)) as an option contract with exercise price θˆi and up–front
payment ui(1). Screening ex ante types then corresponds to offering a menu with two different
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option contracts c1 6= c2. To understand intuitively why the principal does not gain from
screening ex ante types, suppose that c2 is the optimal static contract with θˆ2 = θω and
u2(1) = 0. Now observe that when the principal targets type 1 with an additional but different
contract c1, incentive compatibility requires that type 1 gets at least the same rent from c1 as
from c2. Hence, the principal loses unambiguously from offering a contract c1 with a smaller
exercise price, because the smaller exercise price implies that c1 is less efficient than c2 so that
on top of paying (at least) the same rent to the agent, c1 also generates a smaller aggregate
surplus.
On the contrary, it is not directly obvious that the principal loses from offering a contract
c1 with a larger, more efficient exercise price θˆ1 > θˆ2. The key observation which helps to
understand this is that for θˆ1 > θˆ2 the incentive compatibility constraint (IC12) is necessarily
slack, because the up–front payment to type 1 cannot be negative. Hence, when the principal
increases the exercise price θˆ1 beyond θˆ2, she faces exactly the standard monopsony trade–off
between extending supply and paying a higher price, which, by definition, θ1 solves optimally.
But since θ1 < θω = θˆ2, raising the exercise price θˆ1 beyond θˆ2 is also suboptimal.
It is instructive to see where the previous argument fails when there are only ex ante
participation constraints. Clearly, the same reasoning as above implies that it is suboptimal
to offer a contract c1 with a smaller exercise price θˆ1 < θω. But, with ex ante participation
constraints, the argument is different for a contract with a higher exercise price θˆ1 > θω. In
contrast to the case with ex post participation constraints, the principal can now impose a
negative up–front payment u1(1) < 0 on type 1. Therefore, she can use u1(1) to extract exactly
that part of type 1’s information rent that goes beyond what is needed to guarantee incentive
compatibility.12 In fact, for fixed c2, it is then optimal to set u1(1) so that (IC12) is binding.
Unlike in the case with ex post participation constraints, increasing the exercise price θˆ1 does
therefore no longer go along with increasing type 1’s rent. Consequently, it is optimal to set the
exercise price to maximize aggregate surplus, thus θˆ1 = 1, in accord with the optimal exercise
price θCL1 = 1 from the benchmark in section 4.3.
12We may interpret that part of type 1’s information rent that goes beyond what is needed to guarantee
incentive compatibility as the agent’s ex post information rent, because it results from the fact that all ex post
types who produce the good obtain the higher exercise price. That the principal can use the up–front payment
to fully extract this ex post information rent is equivalent to Eso¨ and Szentes’ (2007a,b) observation that the
principal wants to disclose the maximal amount of ex post information available.
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6 Arbitrary number of ex ante types
In this section, we extend the result of the previous section to the environment with an arbitrary
number of ex ante types. The extension is not straightforward, because in contrast to the two
type case, where there are only local incentive constraints, we now have to deal with both local
and global incentive constraints. It turns out that, in contrast to sequential screening models
with ex ante participation constraints, we cannot use a “Mirrleesian” approach of focusing on
local constraints. Indeed, the major challenge in extending our result lies in identifying the
relevant incentive constraints.
6.1 Auxiliary problem: ui(1) = 0
We begin by considering the problem when the utilities of the least efficient ex post types,
ui(1), are exogenously set to 0. In the next subsection, we argue that this is indeed optimal.
Thus, we first consider the problem
P0 : max
x
∑
i∈ω
pi
∫ 1
0
[v − θ − hi(θ)]xi(θ) dGi(θ) s.t.
xi(θ) is non–increasing in θ, (MON)∫ 1
0
[xi(θ)− xj(θ)]Gi(θ) dθ ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ ω. (IC
0
ij)
Our approach to solving P0 is to solve a relaxed problem where we ignore the monotonicity
constraints and consider only a subset of incentive constraints. The main challenge is to identify
the relevant incentive constraints such that the solution to the relaxed problem will also be a
solution to the original problem, that is, satisfy monotonicity and all ignored constraints.
We identify a subset of constraints IC0ij with the subset of respective indices (i, j). Let
C0 ≡ {(i, j) ∈ ω
2 | i 6= j}. For a subset C ⊆ C0, we denote by R
0(C) the relaxed problem
where only the constraints in C are considered:
R0(C) : max
x
∑
i∈ω
pi
∫ 1
0
[v − θ − hi(θ)]xi(θ) dGi(θ) s.t. IC
0
ij for all (i, j) ∈ C.
To solve problem R0(C), we will work with the Kuhn–Tucker theorem for function spaces.
By Theorem 1 and 2 in Luenberger (1969, p.187–189), {xk(·)}k∈ω solves R
0(C) if and only if
there are multipliers λij ≤ 0 associated to constraint IC
0
ij such that {xk(·)}k∈ω maximizes the
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Lagrangian
L0(C) =
∑
k∈ω
∫ 1
0
pk[v − θ − hk(θ)]xk(θ)gk(θ) dθ −
∑
(i,j)∈C
λij
∫ 1
0
[xi(θ)− xj(θ)]Gi(θ) dθ
=
∑
k∈ω
∫ 1
0

pk[v − θ − hk(θ)]−
∑
j:(k,j)∈C
λkjhk(θ) +
∑
i:(i,k)∈C
λikhi,k(θ)

 xk(θ)gk(θ) dθ,
and, moreover, λij = 0 only if the inequality in IC
0
ij is strict.
By point–wise maximization, the Lagrangian L0(C) is maximized if xk(θ) is set to 1 when-
ever the expression in curly brackets under the integral,
Ψk(θ, C) ≡ pk[v − θ − hk(θ)]−
∑
j:(k,j)∈C
λkjhk(θ) +
∑
i:(i,k)∈C
λikhi,k(θ),
is positive, and xk(θ) is set to 0 otherwise.
13 We summarize this observation in the following
lemma.
Lemma 9 The schedule {xk(·)}k∈ω is a solution to R
0(C) if and only if for all (i, j) ∈ C there
is a λij so that
λij ≤ 0, (KT1)
xk(θ) =

 0 if Ψk(θ, C) < 01 if Ψk(θ, C) > 0 ∀k ∈ ω, (KT2)
λij
∫ 1
0
[xi(θ)− xj(θ)]Gi(θ)dθ = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ C. (KT3)
The main result of this subsection is that the static contract solves problem P0. We organize
the argument in three steps. In step 1, we look for conditions on the constraints C so that a
solution to (KT1)-(KT3) exhibits a monotone and deterministic production schedule. This will
imply that the schedule for a type k is a cutoff schedule with some type specific cutoff. In step
2, we identify conditions so that the resulting cutoffs are the same for all types and equal to
the static cutoff. Clearly, this implies that all neglected constraints are satisfied. Finally, in
step 3, we construct a set of constraints that satisfies the conditions both from step 1 and step
2.
13More precisely, it is sufficient for obtaining a maximum that the previous statement is true for almost all
θ. For simplicity, we ignore issues of zero measure sets in what follows.
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6.1.1 Cutoff contracts
In line with the analysis of the two type case, it seems intuitive to follow a Mirrleesian approach
and to relax the original problem P0 by considering only the “local downward” constraints
IC0i,i+1. To see why this does not work with more than two types, consider the three types
case. When we only consider the local downward constraints IC012 and IC
0
23, then we have with
respect to type k = 2:
Ψ2(θ, C) = p2[v − θ]− [p2 + λ23]h2(θ) + λ12h12(θ). (14)
If Ψ2(θ, C) were decreasing in θ, then the solution x2 to (KT2) would automatically be monotone
and deterministic. Observe that since the (cross) hazard rates are non–increasing, Ψ2(θ, C) is
decreasing provided that p2 + λ23 > 0. The problem is to show that this is true. In the two
types case, we were able to sign the analogous sum of the ex ante probability and the multiplier.
Mimicking this argument, suppose there is a solution θˆ so that Ψ2(θˆ) = 0, and thus
p2 + λ23 =
p2[v − θˆ]
h2(θˆ)
+ λ12h12(θˆ).
From here, we cannot deduce that p2 + λ23 > 0 because of the presence of the negative term
λ12h12(θˆ). For the general case, this suggests that the solution to the relaxed problem does not
automatically display monotonicity, if, for some type k, the relaxed problem involves constraints
IC0kj and IC
0
ik at the same time.
In the three types case we may however consider the relaxed problem with the constraints
IC013 and IC
0
23. Then,
Ψ1(θ) = p1[v − θ − h1(θ)]− λ13h1(θ),
Ψ2(θ) = p2[v − θ − h2(θ)]− λ23h2(θ),
Ψ3(θ) = p3[v − θ − h3(θ)] + λ13h13(θ) + λ23h23(θ).
A similar argument to show monotonicity in (9) and (10) can now be used to show that for
all types k, Ψk(θ) is decreasing in θ. This implies that the solution xk to (KT2) automatically
displays monotonicity. In the general case, this argument extends to any relaxed problem where
the set of constraints is what we call directed :
Definition 1 A set C ⊆ C0 is called directed if for all i:
(i, j) ∈ C for some j ⇒ (k, i) 6∈ C for all k, and (15)
(j, i) ∈ C for some j ⇒ (i, k) 6∈ C for all k. (16)
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For a directed set C ⊆ C0 of constraints, we define by
ωC ≡ {i, j | (i, j) ∈ C}
the set of ex ante types that are part of some constraint in C, and
ω+C = {i | (i, j) ∈ C}, ω
−
C = {j | (i, j) ∈ C}.
Observe that ω+C ∩ ω
−
C = ∅, because C is directed. If C is directed, Ψk boils down to
Ψk(θ, C) =


pk[v − θ − hk(θ)] if k 6∈ ωC
pk[v − θ − hk(θ)] +
∑
i:(i,k)∈C λikhik(θ) if k ∈ ω
−
C
pk[v − θ − hk(θ)]−
∑
j:(k,j)∈C λkjhk(θ) if k ∈ ω
+
C .
(17)
The next lemma shows that for a directed set, the functions Ψk are strictly decreasing provided
they have a root in the interval [0, v].
Lemma 10 Let C be directed and λij ≤ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ C. If there is a solution θˆ ∈ [0, v] to
Ψk(θˆ, C) = 0, then Ψk(θ, C) is strictly decreasing in θ.
Next we show that the Kuhn–Tucker conditions (KT1)-(KT3) imply that for all k and all
(i, j) ∈ C there is indeed a solution θˆk ∈ [0, v] to Ψk(θˆk, C) = 0 with λij ≤ 0. Thus, the previous
lemma implies that the solution to the problem R0(C) automatically satisfies monotonicity.
Lemma 11 Let C be directed. Then any solution {xk(·)}k∈ω to R
0(C) is characterized by a
cutoff schedule xk(θ) = x¯(θ, θˆk) with cutoff θˆk ∈ [0, v] given by Ψk(θˆk, C) = 0. In particular, the
solution satisfies the monotonicity constraint (MON).
6.1.2 Static solutions
We now identify sufficient conditions on the set of constraints C so that the solution to R0(C)
is the optimal static contract. By Lemma 11, this amounts to identifying conditions so that
the cutoffs θˆk are all equal to the static cutoff θ
s.
Observe first that whenever a constraint (i, j) ∈ C is binding, i.e.,
∫ 1
0
[xi − xj] dGi = 0,
then because xi and xj are cutoff schedules by Lemma 11, the respective cutoffs must be the
same: θˆi = θˆj. Similarly, if C contains the constraints (i, j) and (j, k) and both are binding,
then all three cutoffs are the same: θˆi = θˆj = θˆk. This argument extends to any set of binding
constraints which is connected in the following sense.
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Definition 2 Consider a subset C ⊆ C0.
(i) Cis called connected if for all (i, j), (i′, j′) ∈ C, C contains a sequence of pairs (is, js)
S
s=1 so
that
(i1, j1) = (i, j), (i2, j2) = (i2, j), (i3, j3) = (i2, j3), . . . , (iS, jS) = (i
′, j′).
(ii) C is called binding if for any solution {xk(·)}k∈ωC , {λij}(i,j)∈C to (KT1)-(KT3), it holds
λij < 0 for all (i, j) ∈ C.
The next lemma expresses the insight that if the set of constraints is directed, connected and
binding, then for all types in the set of constraints, the solution to the relaxed problem is given
by the same cutoff schedule.
Lemma 12 Let C be directed, connected, and binding. Then for any solution {xk(·)}k∈ω to
R0(C) there is a θˆ ∈ [0, v] such that xk(θ) = x¯(θ; θˆ) for all k ∈ ωC.
By Lemma 11, the cutoff θˆ satisfies the equation Ψk(θˆ, C) = 0 for all types k ∈ ωC . Thus,
solving this system of |ωC | equations pins down the optimal cutoff θˆ. It turns out that θˆ actually
coincides with the optimal static monopsony cutoff, θωC , when the principal faces only types in
ωC .
Lemma 13 Let C be directed, connected, and binding. Then the cutoff in Lemma 12 is given
by θˆ = θωC .
An immediate implication of the previous lemma is that if ωC = ω so that any type appears in
some constraint, then the cutoff is equal to the optimal static cutoff θω. We call such a set C
with ωC = ω exhausting. This means that for a directed, connected, binding, and exhausting
set of constraints C, the solution to R0(C) is the static contract. Since the static contract
(trivially) satisfies all original constraints, it is also a solution to the original problem P0:
Lemma 14 Let C be directed, connected, binding, and exhausting. Then the solution to R0(C)
is the static contract. In particular, the optimal static contract solves the problem P0.
6.1.3 Identifying directed, connected, binding, and exhausting constraints.
We now develop a constructive algorithm which, for any problem P0, yields a directed, con-
nected, binding, and exhausting set of constraints. The construction is non–trivial, because it
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turns out that the relevant set of constraints depends on how the various cutoffs θγ, γ ⊆ ω,
introduced in (3) are ordered. To illustrate this, turn again to the three types case. In the
previous subsection, we relaxed the problem by considering only IC013 and IC
0
23. These two
constraints form a directed, connected, and exhausting set C = {(1, 3); (2, 3)}. To see whether
the set is also binding, we check, for instance, IC023. Ignoring this constraint yields the problem
R0({(1, 3)}) : max
x1,x2,x3
3∑
i=1
pi
∫ 1
0
[v − θ − hi(θ)]xi(θ) dGi(θ) s.t.
∫ 1
0
[x1(θ)− x3(θ)]G1(θ) dθ ≥ 0.
In R({(1, 3)}), the choice variable x2 is unconstrained, and moreover, with respect to the choice
variables x1 and x3, the problem is isomorphic to the two types problem with the types 1 and
3. Thus, the solution x2 is characterized by the public information cutoff θ2. Moreover, by
“induction”, the solution x1 and x3 is given by the optimal static contract in the case in which
the principal faces only the two types 1 and 3. The latter is characterized by the cutoff θ{1,3}
defined by (3). Therefore, the constraint IC023 writes
∫ 1
0
[x2 − x3]G1dθ =
∫ θ2
θ{1,3}
G2dθ ≥ 0, and,
hence, is violated if and only if
θ2 < θ{1,3}. (18)
Accordingly, if (18) holds, IC023 must be binding at the optimum. As a consequence, C =
{(1, 3), (2, 3)} is directed, connected, exhausting and binding so that we have found a solution
by Lemma 14.
For θ2 > θ{1,3}, however, C is not binding and we have to look for a different set of constraints
C ′. It is straightforward to check that in this case the set C ′ = {(1, 2), (1, 3)} is directed,
connected, exhausting and binding. Therefore, whether the appropriate set of constraints is C
or C ′ depends on the ordering of the cutoffs θ2 and θ{1,3}. This insight is key for extending our
result to an arbitrary number of types.
Finally note that for the special case θ2 = θ{1,3}, Lemma 2 implies θ2 = θ{1,3} = θω so
that the solution to R0({(1, 3)}) itself already coincides with the static contract. Hence, it
trivially satisfies both IC023 and IC
0
13 and solves the overall problem. Consequently, we obtain
our result that the static contract is optimal, even though neither C nor C ′ are binding by our
definition. This illustrates that our result also obtains in the special non–generic cases, where
cutoffs coincide, but requires a different (and easier) treatment. For expositional clarity, we
will concentrate on the case where the cutoffs do not coincide and only note that our result
25
also hold for the special cases where cutoffs do coincide. Formally, we assume
θγ 6= θδ for all γ, δ ⊆ ω, γ 6= δ. (19)
We now construct an explicit algorithm that yields a directed, connected, binding and
exhausting subset of constraints for any configuration of cutoffs θγ that satisfies (19).
Our construction is inductive. We first reduce the number of types by merging the largest
and the smallest types and proceed until we are left with two types. The next definition
formalizes this idea. We interpret the set 2ω \ ∅ of non–empty subsets of ω as an index set that
encodes the types of the compressed type space. We abuse notation and identify a type i ∈ ω
with the singleton {i} so that i ∪ j denotes {i, j} etc.
Definition 3 Inductively, for m = n, . . . , 2, define
• Basis (m = n):
⋄ ωn = ω, αn = 1, βn = n.
• Step (m→ m− 1):
⋄ ωm−1 = (ωm \ {αm, βm}) ∪ {αm ∪ βm},
⋄ αm−1 = argmax{θγ | γ ∈ ωm−1} is the set index with the lowest monopsony cutoff,
⋄ βm−1 = argmin{θγ | γ ∈ ωm−1} is the set index with the highest monopsony cutoff.
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The algorithm results in a type space ω2 = {α2, β2} that has two types and by construction
exhibits θα2 < θβ2 . For this case, we already know from the analysis of the two types case
in Section 5 that the set C2 = {(α2, β2)} of constraints is directed, connected, binding and
exhausting. Starting with this constraint, we now expand the type space again in reverse order
and essentially add to C2 the constraint which requires that in the expanded type space ω3, the
type α3 does not mimic type β3. The resulting set C3 is our candidate for a directed, connected,
binding and exhausting set of constraints for ω3. Proceeding in this fashion, we generate a set
Cn of n − 1 constraints for the original type space ω. The procedure is formally described in
the next definition and subsequently illustrated for the three types case.
Definition 4 Inductively, for m = 2, . . . , n− 1, define
• Basis (m = 2):
⋄ C2 = {(α2, β2)}.
14By assumption (19), the types αm−1 and βm−1 are unique.
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• Step (m→ m+ 1):
Define the re–labeling function ρm+1 : Cm → ω
2
m+1 by
ρm+1((γ, δ)) =


(αm+1, δ) if γ = αm+1 ∪ βm+1
(γ, βm+1) if δ = αm+1 ∪ βm+1
(γ, δ) else
and define the set
Cm+1 = ρm+1(Cm) ∪ {(αm+1, βm+1)}.
To highlight how the construction of Cn depends on the primitives, consider explicitly the case
n = 3. To generate ω2, the procedure first merges the highest and the lowest type in ω so that
we get ω2 = {{2}, {1, 3}}. Now if (18) holds, the highest type in ω2 is α2 = {2}, and the lowest
type is β2 = {1, 3}. Therefore, C2 = {({2}, {1, 3})}. To create C3, the procedure re-labels
first the merged type β2 = {1, 3} as type {3}. This yields the set of constraints ρ3(C2) =
{({2}, {3})} which we identify with {(2, 3)}. We subsequently add to this set the constraint
(α1, β1) = (1, 3), resulting in C3 = {(2, 3), (1, 3)}. In contrast, the expansion procedure starts
with C ′2 = {({1, 3}, {2})} for the case θ2 > θ{1,3} and finally yields C
′
3 = {(1, 2), (1, 3)}. By
construction, the sets C3 and C
′
3 are directed, connected, and exhausting. Moreover, as we
have argued above, they are binding for the respective cases θ2 < θ{1,3} and θ2 > θ{1,3}. We
now prove that this insight extends to any configuration of cutoffs θγ that satisfies (19). This
is the key step to establish the main result of our paper.
Lemma 15 The set Cn is directed, connected, binding and exhausting.
Together with Lemma 14, Lemma 15 implies that the static contract solves problem P0. In
problem P0, we set ui(1) exogenously to zero. We now consider the original problem P , in
which ui(1) is a choice variable of the principal.
6.2 Original problem: ui(1) as a choice variable
To solve problem P , we consider the relaxed problem where we ignore the monotonicity con-
straints and consider only the incentive constraints in the set Cn constructed in Definition
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4:
R : max
x,u1(1),...,un(1)
∑
i∈ω
pi
∫ 1
0
[v − θ − hi(θ)]xi(θ) dGi(θ)− piui(1) s.t.
∫ 1
0
[xi(θ)− xj(θ)]Gi(θ) dθ + ui(1)− uj(1) ≥ 0 for all (i, j) ∈ Cn,
ui(1) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ ω.
We now prove that the static contract solves problem R. This establishes the main result of
the paper that the static contract solve problem P .
Theorem 1 The static contract is a solution to problem R. Because the static contract satisfies
all neglected constraints, it is also a solution to the original problem P.
7 Extensions
7.1 Different ex ante and ex post outside options
In the analysis so far, we assumed that the agent’s ex ante outside option coincides with his ex
post outside option. This is the natural assumption when the ex post outside option is type–
independent and does not change over time. Yet from a practical perspective, it is important
to know to what extent our results are robust and extend to differences in ex ante and ex
post outside options. For example, in a procurement relationship, where the agent as a firm is
typically protected by limited liability, the agent can incur some losses without going bankrupt
when he has pledgable assets or other sources of income. In this case, the agent’s ex post
outside option is lower than his ex ante outside option.
To allow for different outside options, we normalize the ex ante outside option to zero and
set the ex post outside option to u¯ ≤ 0. Thus, the ex post individual rationality (6) changes to
ui(θ) ≥ u¯ for all i ∈ ω, θ ∈ [0, 1], (20)
while the ex ante individual rationality constraint (7) remains the same.
We argue that our result that the static contract is optimal still holds as long as u¯ is not too
negative. To see this, note first that if we solve for the optimal contract with the adapted ex
post individual rationality constraint (20) while disregarding the ex ante individual rationality
constraint (7), the only change is that the principal can extract more utility from the agent.
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In particular, the optimal production schedule is equal to the cutoff schedule with the optimal
static cutoff θs, and since the ex post participation constraint (20) is binding at the optimum,
we have that ui(1) = u¯. It follows that the expected utility of ex ante type i is
Ui = u¯+
∫ θs
0
Gidθ.
Hence, if we define
u¯p ≡ −min
i
∫ θs
0
Gidθ,
then for u¯ ≥ u¯p, the solution satisfies automatically the ex ante participation constraint (7).
Thus, for all ex post outside options u¯ ∈ [u¯p, 0], the optimal contract is the static one. Because
u¯p < 0, our result that sequential screening is not helpful with ex post participation constraints
is robust and extends to differences in ex ante and ex post outside options.
Taking the opposite approach and solving the model with the ex ante individual rationality
constraint (7) while disregarding the ex post individual rationality constraint (20) yields the
solution of Lemma 8. In particular, the individual rationality constraint of the highest type
and all local downward incentive constraints are binding. This means that the ex post type
θ = 1 of ex ante type 1 obtains the lowest ex post utility of all ex post agent types and, in
particular,
u1(1) = u¯
a ≡ −
n∑
i=1
∫ θCLi
θCLi+1
Gi(θ)dθ,
where θCLn+1 ≡ 0. Hence, the solution satisfies the neglected ex ante individual rationality
constraint (20) whenever u¯ < u¯a.
It follows that as we vary the ex post outside option u¯, we obtain the sequential screening
models with ex ante and ex post participation constraints as two extremes: the model with ex
ante constraints for u¯ ≤ u¯a and the model with ex post constraints for u¯ ≥ u¯p. A fully fledged
analysis of the intermediate case u¯ ∈ (u¯a, u¯p) lies, due to intractability issues, outside the scope
of this paper. We only mention that simulation exercises for simple models with two ex ante
types show that it depends on the exact magnitude of up which of the incentive, ex ante, and
ex post individual rationality constraints are binding, and that in the interval (u¯a, u¯p) different
types of static and sequential contracts can be optimal.
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7.2 Auctions
Our techniques and results extend readily to settings with multiple agents. Consequently, the
optimal mechanism with ex post participation constraints is equivalent to the static Myerson
(1981) auction that is optimal for the principal when he faces the agents after they received all
their private information. Again, this stands in stark contrast to sequential screening models
with ex ante participation constraints only. In particular, Eso¨ and Szentes (2007b) show that
with multiple agents sequential screening allows the principal to extract all the additional
information embodied in the ex post private information by means of an augmented second
price auction. With ex post outside options, the optimal contract is simpler and the principal
cannot extract the agent’s information rents.
8 Conclusion
This paper shows that introducing ex post participation constraints in a sequential screening
problem eliminates the value of eliciting the agent’s information sequentially. Instead, a static
contract, which conditions only on the agent’s final information is optimal. In this sense, the
value of dynamic over static contracting in the absence of ex post participation constraints is
due to relaxed participation rather than relaxed incentive constraints.
In this paper, we have taken the agent’s outside option as exogenous. In practice, the
outside option is often endogenously determined, for example, by the presence of a spot market
where the agent can trade in any period. Our paper raises the question if dynamic, long–term
contracting has some value when spot markets offer the agent an outside option at any point
in time.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma of 1 Since hij is non–decreasing by assumption, we have
h′ij = (g
2
j )
−1 · (−gigj −Gig
′
j) ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ ω. Hence, for γ, δ ⊂ ω:
h′γ,δ = (g
2
δ )
−1[−gγgδ −Gγg
′
δ] =
1
pγpδ
(g2δ )
−1 ·
∑
i∈γ,j∈δ
pipj(−gigj −Gig
′
j) ≥ 0, (21)
and this proves the claim. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2 By definition, θγ∪δ satisfies the equation
(v − θγ∪δ)
∑
i∈γ∪δ
pigi(θγ∪δ) =
∑
i∈γ∪δ
piGi(θγ∪δ). (22)
Now suppose that contrary to the claim, we have θγ∪δ > max{θγ, θδ}. (Similar arguments apply
to the case θγ∪δ < min{θγ, θδ}.) Then, by monotonicity of the hazard rate and the definition
of θγ, θδ:
v − θγ∪δ <
Gγ(θγ∪δ)
gγ(θγ∪δ)
and v − θγ∪δ <
Gδ(θγ∪δ)
gδ(θγ∪δ)
(23)
⇔ (v − θγ∪δ) · gγ(θγ∪δ) < Gγ(θγ∪δ) and (v − θγ∪δ) · gδ(θγ∪δ) < Gδ(θγ∪δ). (24)
Now multiply the left inequality with pγ and the right with pδ and add them up to get
(v − θγ∪δ)
[∑
i∈γ
pigi(θγ∪δ) +
∑
i∈δ
pigi(θγ∪δ)
]
<
∑
i∈γ
piGi(θγ∪δ) +
∑
i∈δ
piGi(θγ∪δ). (25)
Since γ and δ are disjoint, this can be written as
(v − θγ∪δ)
∑
i∈γ∪δ
pigi(θγ∪δ) <
∑
i∈γ∪δ
piGi(θγ∪δ), (26)
a contradiction to (22). Q.E.D.
Derivation of (8) and Proof of Lemma 4 By (RE),∫ 1
0
uj(θ) dGi(θ) =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
θ
xj(z) dz gi(θ) dθ + uj(1) (27)
=
∫ 1
θ
xj(z) dz ·Gi(θ)
∣∣∣1
0
−
∫ 1
0
−xj(θ)Gi(θ) dθ + uj(1) (28)
=
∫ 1
0
xj(θ)Gi(θ) dθ + uj(1), (29)
where we have used integration by parts in the second line.
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Thus, for j = i, it follows that∫ 1
0
ui(θ) dGi(θ) =
∫ 1
0
xi(θ)hi(θ) dGi(θ) + ui(1). (30)
Plugging this in the principal’s objective delivers (8).
Moreover, since Uij =
∫ 1
0
uj(θ) dGi(θ), (29) implies that the first period incentive compat-
ibility condition Ui − Uij ≥ 0 is equivalent to (ICij), and this is what we wanted to show.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 10 Because the hazard rate hk(θ) is non–decreasing and pk[v− θ] is strictly
decreasing, it follows that pk[v−θ−hk(θ)] is strictly decreasing. This establishes that Ψk(θ, C)
is strictly decreasing in θ for k 6∈ ωC . In addition, λkj ≤ 0 and non–decreasing cross hazard
rates hkj(θ) imply that
∑
i:(i,k)∈C λikhik(θ) is non–increasing in θ. Hence, Ψk(θ, C) is strictly
decreasing in θ also for k ∈ ω−C . Finally, to see that Ψk(θ, C) is strictly decreasing in θ also for
k ∈ ω+C , first rewrite Ψk(θ, C) for k ∈ ω
+
C as
Ψk(θ, C) = pk[v − θ]−

pk + ∑
j:(k,j)∈C
λkj

hk(θ). (31)
By assumption, Ψk(θˆ, C) = 0 for some θˆ ∈ [0, v]. For k ∈ ω
+
C , this implies that
pk +
∑
j:(k,j)∈C
λkj =
pk[v − θˆ]
hk(θˆ)
≥ 0. (32)
The non–decreasing hazard rate hk(·) therefore implies that (pk +
∑
j:(k,j)∈C λkj)hk(θ) is non–
decreasing. Due to the term pk[v − θ], it then follows that (31) is strictly decreasing in θ.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 11 By Lemma 9 any solution {xk(·)}k∈ω to R
0(C) satisfies (KT1)–KT3. We
distinguish the three possible cases:
Case k 6∈ ωC : In this case, Ψ(θk, C) = 0 by definition of θk. Since θk < v, Lemma 10 implies
that Ψk(θ, C) > 0 for all θ ∈ [0, θk) and Ψk(θ, C) < 0 for all θ ∈ (θk, 1]. By (KT2), any solution
therefore exhibits xk(θ) = 1[0,θk](θ).
15
Case k ∈ ω−C : In this case, Ψk(0, C) = pkv > 0 and, by (KT1), Ψk(θk, C) =
∑
i:(i,k)∈C λikhik(θk) ≤
0. Continuity of Ψk(θ, C) in θ then implies there exists a θˆk ∈ (0, θk] such that Ψk(θˆk, C) = 0.
Because θˆk ≤ θk < v, Lemma 10 applies so that Ψk(θ, C) is strictly decreasing in θ. Hence,
15Let 1A(a) express the indicator function: It takes value 1 if a ∈ A and 0 otherwise.
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Ψk(θ, C) > 0 for all θ ∈ [0, θˆk) and Ψk(θ, C) < 0 for all θ ∈ (θˆk, 1]. By (KT2), any solution
therefore exhibits xk(θ) = 1[0,θk](θ).
Case k ∈ ω+C : We prove by contradiction that there exists a θˆk ∈ [0, v] such that Ψk(θˆk, C) = 0.
For suppose the contrary, then, by Ψk(0, C) = pkv > 0 and continuity of Ψk(θ, C) in θ, it must
hold Ψk(θ, C) > 0 for all θ ∈ [0, v]. First, this implies, by (KT2), that for any solution it must
hold xk(θ) = 1 for any θ ∈ [0, v]. Second, it implies that Ψk(v, C) = −[pk+
∑
j:(k,j)∈C λkj]hk(v) >
0 so that necessarily
∑
j:(k,j)∈C λkj < −pk. Hence, there must be at least one j ∈ ω
−
C such that
λkj < 0, implying by (KT3) that ICkj is satisfied in equality. But because j ∈ ω
−
C , we just
established that for any solution there exists a θˆj < v such that xj(θ) = 1[0,θˆj ](θ). It therefore
follows ∫ 1
0
[xk(θ)− xj(θ)]Gk(θ)dθ ≥
∫ v
θˆj
Gk(θ)dθ > 0.
Using (KT3), this leads to the contradiction that λkj = 0. Consequently, there must exist
a θˆk ∈ [0, v] such that Ψk(θˆk, C) = 0. By Lemma 10, Ψk(θ, C) > 0 for all θ ∈ [0, θˆk) and
Ψk(θ, C) < 0 for all θ ∈ (θˆk, 1]. By (KT2), any solution therefore exhibits xk(θ) = 1[0,θˆk](θ).
We conclude that any solution is characterized by a cutoff schedule xk(θ) = x¯(θ, θˆk), where
the cutoff θˆk ∈ [0, v] solves Ψk(θˆk, C) = 0. This solution trivially satisfies the monotonicity
constraint (MON). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 12 Because C is binding, for any (i, j) ∈ C it holds λij < 0 such that (KT3)
implies ∫ 1
0
[xi(θ)− xj(θ)]Gi(θ))dθ = 0. (33)
Because by Lemma 11 xi(·) and xj(·) are increasing cutoff schedules with respective cutoffs θˆi
and θˆj, (33) can only hold if θˆi = θˆj. Connectedness then implies that for any i, j ∈ ωC , the
cutoffs are the same. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 13 From Lemma 11 and Lemma 12 it follows that θˆ satisfies Ψk(θˆ, C) = 0
for all k ∈ ωC . Because C is directed, we have for all k ∈ ωC that either k ∈ ω
+
C or (exclusively)
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k ∈ ω−C . Multiplying Ψk(θˆ, C) by gk(θˆ) and adding up delivers
0 =
∑
k∈ωC
Ψk(θˆ, C)gk(θˆ) (34)
=
∑
k∈ωC
pk[v − θˆ]gk(θˆ)− pkGk(θˆ) (35)
−
∑
k∈ω+C
∑
j:(k,j)∈C
λkjhk(θˆ)gk(θˆ) +
∑
k∈ω−C
∑
i:(i,k)∈C
λikhi,k(θˆ)gk(θˆ) (36)
=
∑
k∈ωC
pk[v − θˆ]gk(θˆ)− pkGk(θˆ) (37)
−
∑
k∈ω+C
∑
j:(k,j)∈C
λkjGk(θˆ) +
∑
j∈ω−C
∑
k:(k,j)∈C
λkjGk(θˆ). (38)
The last inequality follows by re-labeling the summation index of the second double sum and by
definition of hk and hi,k. Now observe that in the last line, every pair (k, j) that appears under
the first double sum also appears under the second double sum (and vice versa). Therefore,
the last line is zero, and we obtain
0 =
∑
k∈ωC
pk[v − θˆ]gk(θˆ)− pkGk(θˆ) ⇔ v = θˆ +
∑
k∈ωC
pkGk(θˆ)∑
k∈ωC
pkgk(θˆ)
, (39)
which by (3) implies θˆ = θωC . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 14 The claim is a direct implication of Lemmata 11, 12, and 13. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 15 The set Cn is directed, connected, and exhausting by construction. To
show that it is binding, we have to show that any solution to (KT1)-(KT3) satisfies
λγ,δ < 0 ∀(γ, δ) ∈ Cn. (40)
We only consider the case in which θ{1,n} < θω\{1,n}. (The argument for the reverse case is
analogous.)
Step 1 : We begin by showing that
λ1n < 0. (41)
Contrary to (41), suppose there is a solution {xη(·)}η∈ω to (KT1)-(KT3) so that λ1n = 0. By
construction of Cn, the pair (1, n) is the only pair in Cn that involves the index n. Together
with λ1n = 0, this implies that
Ψn(θ, Cn) = pn[v − θ − hn(θ)]. (42)
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Hence, (KT2) implies that xn = 1[0,θn]. Next, we determine x1. We distinguish two cases.
(1) If λ1δ = 0 for all δ with (1, δ) ∈ Cn, the same reasoning as in the previous paragraph
delivers that x1 = 1[0,θ1]. Since θ1 < θn by assumption, {xη(·)}η∈ω violates the constraint
(1, n) ∈ Cn, a contradiction to the assumption that {xη(·)}η∈ω is a solution to R
0(Cn).
(2) Suppose that λ1δ∗ < 0 for some (1, δ
∗) ∈ Cn. We shall derive a contradiction in a similar
fashion as in the previous paragraph by first determining x1 and then comparing it to xn. Let
A = {(γ, δ) ∈ Cn | λγδ < 0} ⊂ Cn (43)
be the set of binding constraints in Cn. It is non–empty, as it contains (1, δ
∗). Let B be the
largest connected set in A which contains (1, δ∗). By definition of B, we have
η ∈ ωB ⇔ (η, δ) ∈ B for all (η, δ) ∈ Cn with ληδ < 0, or (44)
(γ, η) ∈ B for all (γ, η) ∈ Cn with λγη < 0. (45)
This implies that for all η ∈ ωB we can write
Ψη(θ, Cn) = pη[v − θ − hη(θ)]−
∑
δ:(η,δ)∈Cn
ληδhη(θ) +
∑
γ:(γ,η)∈Cn
λγηhγ,η(θ) (46)
= pη[v − θ − hη(θ)]−
∑
δ:(η,δ)∈B
ληδhη(θ) +
∑
γ:(γ,η)∈B
λγηhγ,η(θ) (47)
= Ψη(θ, B). (48)
Therefore, (KT2) for C = Cn implies that
xη(θ) =

 0 if Ψη(θ, B) < 01 if Ψη(θ, B) > 0 ∀η ∈ ωB. (49)
Moreover, (KT1) and (KT3) for C = Cn (trivially) imply
λγδ ≤ 0, and λγδ
∫ 1
0
[xγ(θ)− xδ(θ)]Gγ(θ)dθ = 0 ∀(γ, δ) ∈ B. (50)
The conditions (49) and (50) are the first order conditions for the problem R0(B) (when the
type space is ωB). Therefore, the solution xη(·) for η ∈ ωB to R
0(Cn) is given by the solution
xη(·) to R
0(B). Because B as a subset of the directed set Cn is itself directed and, because
it is connected and binding by definition, Lemma 12 and 13 imply that for all η ∈ ωB and in
particular for η = 1 ∈ ωB, we have:
xη = x1 = 1[0,θωB ]. (51)
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Because n 6∈ ωB, it follows, by assumption, θη < θn for all η ∈ ωB. By Lemma 2 it then follows
θωB < θn, and thus x1(·) < xn(·). But this violates the constraint (1, n) ∈ Cn, a contradiction
to the assumption that {xη(·)}η∈ω is a solution to R
0(Cn).
Step 2: We now show the rest of (40) by induction over the number of types n. More precisely
the induction hypothesis is that (40) is true for any model with n− 1 types.
Base (n = 2): By assumption θ1 < θ2 so that C2 = {(1, 2)}. Thus, Step 1 implies that λ12 < 0,
as desired.
Step (n − 1 → n): Let (x, λ) = ({xk(·)}k∈ω, {λij}(i,j)∈Cn) be a solution to (KT1)-(KT3) (for
C = Cn). Contrary to the claim, suppose that
λij = 0 for some (i, j) ∈ Cn with (i, j) 6= (1, n). (52)
We will derive a contradiction to the induction hypothesis by constructing a model with n− 1
types and a solution to (KT1)
n−1-(KT3)
n−1 (for C = Cn−1) which violates (40)
n−1.16
By Lemma 11, (x, λ) displays for each k a cutoff θˆk ∈ [0, v] so that xk = 1[0,θˆk], and
Ψk(θˆk, Cn) = 0. (53)
Moreover, the argument in the proof of Lemma 12 implies that for all (i, j) ∈ Cn:
λij < 0 ⇒ θˆi = θˆj. (54)
Consider now the model with n− 1 types when types 1 and n are merged so that the new type
space is ωn−1 = {{1, n}, 2, . . . , n − 1}. We indicate the variables pertaining to this model by
a superindex n− 1. From the solution (x, λ) to (KT1)
n-(KT3)
n (for C = Cn), we propose the
following candidate solution (xn−1, λn−1) to (KT1)
n−1-(KT3)
n−1 (for C = Cn−1):
xn−1k = xk = 1[0,θˆk] for all k = 2, . . . , n− 1, (55)
xn−1{1,n} = x1 = 1[0,θˆ1], (56)
λn−1γδ = λγδ for all (γ, δ) ∈ Cn−1 with γ 6= {1, n}, (57)
λn−1{1,n}δ = λ1δ ·
G1(θˆ1)
G{1,n}(θˆ1)
for all ({1, n}, δ) ∈ Cn−1. (58)
16In what follows, the exponent on the equation reference refers to the number of types of the model under
consideration.
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(Observe that because θ{1,n} > θω\{1,n} by assumption, we have by construction of the set Cn−1
that (1, δ) ∈ Cn if and only if ({1, n}, δ) ∈ Cn−1.)
By (52), this definition implies that there is a (γ, δ) ∈ Cn−1 so that λ
n−1
γδ = 0. Thus, it is
sufficient to show that
(xn−1, λn−1) satisfies (KT1)
n−1-(KT3)
n−1 (for C = Cn−1) , (59)
because then we would have found a model with n−1 types that violates (40)n−1, a contradiction
to the induction hypothesis.
We now show (59).
• That (xn−1, λn−1) satisfies (KT1)
n−1 is trivial.
• To see that (xn−1, λn−1) satisfies (KT2)
n−1, observe that since xn−1k is a cutoff schedule for all
k ∈ ωn−1, we only have to show that Ψ
n−1
k (·, Cn−1) equals zero at the respective cutoff of x
n−1
k .
By the definition (55) and (56) of xn−1k , this means we have to show:
Ψn−1k (θˆk, Cn−1) = 0 for all k = 2, . . . , n− 1, and Ψ
n−1
{1,n}(θˆ1, Cn−1) = 0. (60)
Recall that θ{1,n} > θω\{1,n} by assumption. Thus, the set Cn−1 is constructed by removing
(1, n) from Cn and then re-labeling the index 1 as {1, n}. Moreover, (1, n) is the only pair in
Cn that involves the index n. Thus,
For all k ∈ ω+n−1 \ {1, n} : (k, δ) ∈ Cn−1 ⇔ (k, δ) ∈ Cn, (61)
For all k ∈ ω−n−1 : (γ, k) ∈ Cn−1 ⇔ (γ, k) ∈ Cn, or (γ = {1, n} and (1, k) ∈ Cn). (62)
We now establish the left part of (60). For k ∈ ω+n−1 \ {1, n}, (61) together with (53) and (57)
implies that
Ψn−1k (θˆk, Cn−1) = pk[v − θˆk − hk(θˆk)]−
∑
δ:(k,δ)∈Cn−1
λn−1kδ hk(θˆk) (63)
= pk[v − θˆk − hk(θˆk)]−
∑
δ:(k,δ)∈Cn
λkδhk(θˆk) = Ψk(θˆk, Cn) = 0. (64)
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Moreover, for k ∈ ω−n−1, (62) together with (57) and (58) implies that
Ψn−1k (θˆk, Cn−1) = pk[v − θˆk − hk(θˆk)] +
∑
γ:(γ,k)∈Cn−1
λn−1γk hγ,k(θˆk) (65)
= pk[v − θˆk − hk(θˆk)] +
∑
γ:(γ,k)∈Cn−1
γ 6={1,n}
λn−1γk hγ,k(θˆk) + λ
n−1
{1,n}kh{1,n},k(θˆk) (66)
= pk[v − θˆk − hk(θˆk)] +
∑
γ:(γ,k)∈Cn
γ 6=1
λγkhγ,k(θˆk) (67)
+λ1k ·
G1(θˆ1)
G{1,n}(θˆ1)
h{1,n},k(θˆk),
where we make use of the convention: λn−1{1,n}k = 0 if ({1, n}, k) 6∈ Cn−1 and λ1k = 0 if (1, k) 6∈
Cn−1. We now distinguish two cases. If λ1k = 0, then the last term in the previous expression
vanishes, and we can as well write
Ψn−1k (θˆk, Cn−1) = pk[v − θˆk − hk(θˆk)] +
∑
γ:(γ,k)∈Cn
γ 6=1
λγkhγ,k(θˆk) + λ1kh1,k(θˆk) = Ψk(θˆk, Cn), (68)
which is zero by (53), as desired. If λ1k < 0, then θˆ1 = θˆk by (54), so that
G1(θˆ1)
G{1,n}(θˆ1)
h{1,n},k(θˆk) =
G1(θˆ1)
G{1,n}(θˆ1)
·
G{1,n}(θˆ1)
gk(θˆ1)
= h1,k(θˆk). (69)
Consequently, we also have in this case that Ψn−1k (θˆk, Cn−1) = Ψk(θˆk, Cn), which is zero by (53).
This completes the proof of the left part of (60).
We are left to show the right part of (60), i.e. Ψn−1{1,n}(θˆ1, Cn−1) = 0. By assumption,
θ{1,n} > θω\{1,n}. It is easy to see that this implies {1, n} ∈ ω
+
n−1. Hence, TO
DO
Ψn−1{1,n}(θˆ1, Cn−1) = p{1,n}[v − θˆ1 − h{1,n}(θˆ1)]−
∑
δ:({1,n},δ)∈Cn−1
λn−1{1,n}δh{1,n}(θˆ1) (70)
=
[v − θˆ1]p{1,n}g{1,n}(θˆ1)− p{1,n}G{1,n}(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
(71)
−
∑
δ:({1,n},δ)∈Cn−1
λn−1{1,n}δh{1,n}(θˆ1),
where in the second line we have took 1/g{1,n}(θˆ1) out of the square brackets. By (58) and the
definition of G{1,n} and g{1,n}, and since ({1, n}, δ) ∈ Cn−1 if and only if (1, δ) ∈ Cn and δ 6= n,
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this can be re-written as
Ψn−1{1,n}(θˆ1, Cn−1) =
[v − θˆ1] · {p1g1(θˆ1) + pngn(θˆ1)} − p1G1(θˆ1)− pnGn(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
(72)
−
∑
δ:(1,δ)∈Cn
δ 6=n
λ1,δ
G1(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
Now add and subtract λ1nG1(θˆ1)/g1(θˆ1) to obtain
Ψn−1{1,n}(θˆ1, Cn−1) =
1
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
{
p1[(v − θˆ1)g1(θˆ1)−G1(θˆ1)]− λ1nG1(θˆ1) (73)
−
∑
δ:(1,δ)∈Cn
δ 6=n
λ1,δG1(θˆ1)


+
1
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
{
pn[(v − θˆ1)gn(θˆ1)−Gn(θˆ1)] + λ1nG1(θˆ1)
}
.
The first two lines on the right hand side can be written as
g1(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
·
p1[(v − θˆ1)g1(θˆ1)−G1(θˆ1)]−
∑
δ:(1,δ)∈Cn
λ1δG1(θˆ1)
g1(θˆ1)
=
g1(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
·Ψ1(θˆ1, Cn). (74)
Moreover, since (1, n) is the only pair in Cn that involves the index n, the third line becomes
g1(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
·
pn[(v − θˆ1)gn(θˆ1)−Gn(θˆ1)] + λ1nG1(θˆ1)
g1(θˆ1)
=
g1(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
·Ψn(θˆ1, Cn) (75)
=
g1(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
·Ψn(θˆn, Cn), (76)
where in the last line we have used that λ1n < 0 by Step 1 which implies θˆ1 = θˆn by (54).
Hence, by (53):
Ψn−1{1,n}(θˆ1, Cn−1) =
g1(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
·Ψ1(θˆ1, Cn) +
g1(θˆ1)
g{1,n}(θˆ1)
·Ψn(θˆn, Cn) = 0, (77)
and this completes the proof of the right part of (60).
• To complete the proof of (59), it remains to be shown that (xn−1, λn−1) satisfies (KT3)
n−1.
Consider (γ, δ) ∈ Cn−1. If λ
n−1
γδ = 0, (KT3)
n−1 holds trivially. If λn−1γδ < 0, then (54)-(58) imply
that xn−1γ = x
n−1
δ . Accordingly, (KT3)
n−1 also holds in this case.
This establishes (59) and completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 1 For all k ∈ ω, let xsk(θ) = 1[0,θω ](θ) be the production schedule and
usk(1) = 0 the least efficient ex post type’s utility level under the static contract. By the Kuhn–
Tucker theorem, we have to show that there are multipliers λij ≤ 0, (i, j) ∈ Cn, and µk ≤ 0,
k ∈ ω, so that ({xsk(·)}k∈ω, {u
s
k(1)}k∈ω) maximizes the Lagrangian
L =
∑
k∈ω
{∫ 1
0
pk[v − θ − hk(θ)]xk(θ)gk(θ) dθ − pkuk(1)
}
(78)
−
∑
(i,j)∈Cn
λij
[∫ 1
0
[xi(θ)− xj(θ)]Gi(θ) dθ + ui(1)− uj(1)
]
−
∑
k∈ω
µkuk(1)
=
∑
k∈ω
∫ 1
0

pk[v − θ − hk(θ)]−
∑
j:(k,j)∈Cn
λkjhk(θ) +
∑
i:(i,k)∈Cn
λikhi,k(θ)

 xk(θ)gk(θ) dθ(79)
−
∑
k∈ω

pk +
∑
j:(k,j)∈Cn
λkj −
∑
i:(i,k)∈Cn
λik + µk

 uk(1),
where λij = 0 or µk = 0 only if the respective constraints are not binding. Now, let λij < 0 be
as in the proof of Lemma 15, and define
µk =

 −pk −
∑
j:(k,j)∈Cn
λkj if k ∈ ω
+
Cn
−pk +
∑
i:(i,k)∈Cn
λik if k ∈ ω
−
Cn
. (80)
Then the curly brackets in the last line are zero, and the Lagrangian L is identical to the
Lagrangian for the problem R0(C). Therefore, by Lemma 11 and 15, ({xsk(·)}k∈ω, {u
s
k(1)}k∈ω)
maximizes L. It remains to be shown that µk ≤ 0. Since λik < 0, the claim is trivial for
k ∈ ω−Cn . For k ∈ ω
+
Cn
, recall from (32) in the proof of Lemma 10 that −pk−
∑
j:(k,j)∈Cn
λkj ≥ 0.
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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